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ABSTRACT: Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? 
I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could 
have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend 
not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at 
least a plausible case can be made for the possibility of zero premise arguments. 
KEYWORDS: argument, infinite, premise, reasons, regress, zero 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most definitions of argument are noncommittal when it comes to how many premises an 
argument can have. For example, consider what Douglas Walton calls the typical or con-
ventional definition of argument: “An argument is a set of propositions, one of which is 
the conclusion and the remainder are premises.” (Walton 1996: 3) For all this definition 
says, the remainder could be anything from zero to infinity. But some definitions or artic-
ulations do make a commitment. For example, Mark Vorobej writes: “We’ll stipulate that 
each argument has a single conclusion and any finite number of premises greater than or 
equal to one.” (Vorobej 2006: 8)  Many authors of definitions of argument would, I sus-
pect, accept Vorobej’s exclusion of at least one, if not both, of zero and infinity as possi-
ble numbers of premises.  Indeed, very few, if any, definitions exist that explicitly identi-
fy zero or infinity as allowable numbers of premises.
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 In this paper I explore whether or not it is possible for an argument to have ei-
ther zero premises or an infinite number of premises. I shall argue, in Section 2, that re-
gardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could 
have an infinite number of premises. The zero case, which I turn to in Section 3, is more 
complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, 
but also on how one answers questions about (a) the relationship between arguing and 
arguments and (b) whether the function of arguments or arguing is necessary for distin-
guishing arguments from non-arguments. I shall argue that certain plausible answers to 
(a) and (b) allow for the possibility of zero premise arguments. 
                                                 
1  Terence Parsons (1996) explicitly describes what he calls a successful argument with an infinite number 
of steps, even though his definition of argument is noncommittal. Similarly, Roy Sorensen, in Sorensen 
1999, explicitly argues for zero premise arguments, but never provides a definition of argument. 
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2. CAN AN ARGUMENT HAVE INFINITE PREMISES? 
Suppose arguments are composed of propositions. Define a simple argument as a set of a 
set of propositions (the premise set) and another proposition (the conclusion). Define a 
complex argument as a set of simple arguments. [Clearly this definition of complex ar-
guments is inadequate for capturing what most people think of when they think of com-
plex arguments, i.e., arguments composed of simple arguments joined in some way, since 
the definition says nothing about whether the arguments in the set are joined or not. For 
my purposes here it turns out to be irrelevant how the arguments are joined—it merely 
matters how many there are, so I sidestep the thorny issue of trying to articulate an ade-
quate notion of how simple arguments may be joined to form complex arguments.] Given 
these definitions there are two questions. Firstly, is there any good reason to hold that the 
premise set of a simple argument cannot have an infinite number of propositions as 
members? Secondly, even if the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, is there any good 
reason to suppose that a complex argument could not have an infinite number of mem-
bers? If either answer is ‘no’, then given that there are infinite sets of propositions and 
infinite sets of sets of propositions, there will be no good reason to say that an argument 
cannot have an infinite number of premises. 
 We can certainly stipulate that the sets in question be finite, but is there any reason 
to prohibit the infinite cases? Considered merely as abstract objects, the answer has to be 
‘no’. There are sets of premise sets and conclusions in which the premise set contains zero 
members, some finite number of members, and at least denumerably infinite members. Lo-
gicians and mathematicians make use of these sets to prove various theorems such as the 
completeness of various logical systems. If there is a reason for excluding the infinite case, 
then that reason must concern something external to the nature of propositions and sets. 
 Why might one claim that the finite cases are arguments, but the infinite cases 
are not? Perhaps, to count as an argument we must be able to express it, and we cannot 
express infinite sets of propositions. Alternatively, perhaps to count as an argument there 
must be a corresponding act of arguing, and we, finite beings that we are, just cannot ar-
gue with an infinite number of premises. 
 Consider the latter claim—we restrict the sets of propositions that count as ar-
guments because we cannot argue using an infinite set of premises. Presumably such an 
appeal would also be a reason for someone who holds that arguments are complex acts, 
rather than sets of propositions, to restrict which potential complex acts could count as 
arguments. Given that arguing is a kind of act, what we can and cannot argue is an inter-
nal matter with respect to the position that arguments are complex acts. Hence, if the rea-
son can be shown to fail, even in the case in which arguments are taken to be complex 
acts, then it will certainly fail as a reason to restrict the sets of propositions that count as 
arguments. Similarly for the former claim—if what can and cannot be expressed fails to 
exclude infinite premise arguments when arguments are taken to be sentences or expres-
sions in some language, then it will certainly fail as a reason for restricting which sets of 
propositions count as arguments. 
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 So suppose we take arguments to be sets or groups of sentences.
2
 If arguments 
are taken to be sets of sentences, then, just as in the case of sets of propositions, there will 
be no reason, with respect to the nature of sets, to restrict arguments to having finite 
premises. Just as there are infinite sets of propositions, there are infinite sets of sentences 
(at least sentence types, which are just another kind of abstract object). So any reason to 
restrict which sets of sentences count as arguments would have to appeal to restrictions 
on sentence tokens or to restrictions on what we can or cannot do with sentences. 
 Sentences, at least sentence tokens, are not abstract objects. As finite beings, at 
best we can only produce texts composed of finite sentence tokens, so it is just impossible 
for us to provide or use a group of sentences that has an infinite number of members. But 
is this mere practical limitation enough to exclude the case of an infinite number of sen-
tences being part of or constituting an argument? God has no such limitation, and so God 
could express or write down an argument with an infinite number of sentences as premis-
es. (God might have to alter the structure of our universe first though—our current best 
estimates for the number of atoms in the universe is 1080, which, while quite large, is far 
from infinite.  So, even assuming God could use a single atom to write a premise, at the 
very least God could not have all the premises written down at the same time—though as 
long as God could perform supertasks, he could reuse atoms and still write the entire ar-
gument down in a finite amount of time.) Regardless, I will not pursue this line of de-
fence further since I am going to challenge the claim that we do not in fact provide or 
make use of texts that express arguments composed of an infinite number of sentences. 
 Being finite beings we do not actually write down infinite premise arguments—
at least such arguments in which we token every premise individually. But we do have 
the expressive means to make clear that we are in fact deploying an argument with an in-
finite number of sentences. As Terence Parsons puts it:  “Even if a text containing an ar-
gument must, by the nature of a text, be finite, this would not extend to refined arguments 
embodied in the text.” (Parsons 1996: 172, n9) Consider, for example, the following ar-
gument: 
(A) 1 can be paired with 2. 
2 can be paired with 4. 
3 can be paired with 6. 
. 
. 
. ___________________________________ 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
Why think (A) is an argument with an infinite number of premises? Because it is the 
same argument as both: 
                                                 
2  Some might include statements as a possibility here. I avoid the use of ‘statement’ since it is ambiguous 
between what is stated (which could be the actual words used, or the proposition expressed by those 
words), or the act of uttering or writing the words. 
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(B) 1 can be paired with 2. 
2 can be paired with 4. 
3 can be paired with 6. 
4 can be paired with 8. 
. 
. 
. ___________________________________ 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
and 
(C) 1 can be paired with 2. 
2 can be paired with 4. 
3 can be paired with 6. 
4 can be paired with 8. 
5 can be paired with 10. 
. 
. 
. ___________________________________ 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
Why think (A), (B), and (C) are all the same argument? All three arguments are success-
ful or unsuccessful together and if they are successful or unsuccessful it will be for the 
exact same reason in each case. All three arguments appeal to the same number of prem-
ises—they just differ on how many of those premises they make explicit rather than im-
plicit in the ellipsis. And surely the decision about when to stop listing premises and put 
in the ellipsis does not make a difference to the argument being made. 
 Suppose, however, that one insists that the three arguments are in fact distinct. 
But on what basis? We cannot rely solely on the explicitly presented premises or else we 
will not be able distinguish (A) from: 
(A-) 1 can be paired with 2. 
2 can be paired with 4. 
3 can be paired with 6. 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
But (A-) by itself is an awful argument, and whether (A) is ultimately good or bad, it will 
not be bad for the same obvious reason as (A-). For example, I suspect many would grant 
that (A-) is an example of hasty generalization, whereas (A) is not. If (A) and (A-) are 
distinct arguments, then, following the same pattern, (B) and (B-), and (C) and (C-), and 
so on are distinct arguments. But by similar, though not exactly the same, reasoning we 
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can also show that (A) is not the same as any of the finite (-) arguments.
3
 The only plau-
sible option left is that (A), (B), (C), etc., all are shorthand expressions of the infinite 
premise argument. 
 Suppose one admits that (A), (B), (C), and so on are the same argument, but not in 
virtue of expressing an argument with an infinite number of premises, but in virtue of being 
in an equivalence class together. Whatever the equivalence relation is that puts them all in the 
same class, it presumably has to exclude (A-) and so on from being in the class. But then 
what could this equivalence relation be other than the infinite premise case? Indeed, what 
could exclude the infinite case from being in the class itself? But if the infinite premise case 
satisfies the equivalence relation, then it is the same argument as the others, in which case it 
is an argument, and so some arguments have an infinite number of premises. 
 To sum up: Absent some sort of ad hoc stipulation about what the ellipsis stands 
for in arguments (A), (B), (C) etc., the most plausible account of these arguments is that 
they all stand in for an argument with an infinite number of premises. Hence, the fact that 
we are limited to finite texts to express arguments does not entail that the arguments 
themselves are finite. So far then, those who hold that arguments are composed of sen-
tences do not have a good reason to reject the possibility of infinite premise arguments. 
 Suppose we take arguments to be composed of acts such as utterances. We can-
not perform an infinite number of utterances and so cannot perform the complex act that 
would be an argument with an infinite number of premises. 
 But the reasoning for the case of sentences carries over to the case of acts. Firstly, 
just because we are so limited does not prohibit God from performing such acts, and so God 
could perform the act that is arguing with an infinite number of premises. Secondly, let us say 
that the arguments (A), (B), etc. are not the groups of sentences, but rather my utterances of 
those sentences. What then is the force of the utterance of the phrase ‘and so on’ in each of 
the arguments? I argue that it is a finite act that is a stand in for performing the infinite num-
ber of acts in the same pattern as the already uttered premises that remain.  But if so, then 
while (A), (B), and (C) are different finite acts, they are all stand-ins for the same complex 
infinite act, i.e., an act that contains an infinite number of premise utterances. 
 Suppose, however, one insists that (A), (B), (C), and so on are not just stand-ins 
for an infinite act, but rather just distinct complex finite acts, and so distinct arguments.  
But now consider the following new argument: 
(A*) 1 can be paired with 2. 
2 can be paired with 4. 
3 can be paired with 6. 
. 
. 
. ___________________________________ 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
                                                 
3  The reasoning is the same for showing that (A) is not the same as (B-) and (C-), but after perhaps a mil-
lion or so premises one might reasonably hold that whatever the (-) argument’s fault is, it is no longer 
hasty generalization. Now the problem becomes giving a reason other than mere stipulation that (A) is 
shorthand for the million premise argument rather than the million and one or million and twenty prem-
ise arguments, etc. 
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New? Isn’t (A*) just (A)? No. (A*) occurred later than (A), and acts are differentiated in 
part by the time of their occurrence, so (A*) is not the same argument as (A). We could 
avoid this problem by resorting to act types. But now the question becomes what makes 
(A) and (A*) both acts of the same type such that we would say they are the same argu-
ment. The obvious answer is that they have the same content. But if, when identifying 
different act tokens as the same argument, we are relying on content, then (A), (B), (C), 
etc. once again count as different act tokens which are of the same act type—an act type 
with infinite premises. 
 An act theorist can stay the course and just insist that (A) and (A*) are different 
arguments. The price tag, however, is high. On such a fine-grained view of distinct argu-
ments, every argument happens exactly once. Arguments cannot be repeated, though new 
arguments with the same content might occur numerous times. I cannot re-present your 
arguments—I can present my arguments with the same content as yours. Perhaps some 
are willing to pay the price. I find it prohibitive. 
 Granted the price tag is high, but not as high, some might argue, as accepting 
arguments with infinite premises. Regardless of the metaphysics of arguments, that an 
argument might have infinite premises is just absurd. For example, Daniel Bonevac, in 
his textbook Simple Logic defines an argument, in part, as a finite string of statements. He 
goes on to write: “it is important that the string of premises be finite. If the premises nev-
er end, the conclusion is never established.” (Bonevac 1999: 3) 
 There are two problems with Bonevac’s claim. Firstly, the fact that an argument 
with infinite premises would, if Bonevac is right, fail to establish its conclusion does not 
mean the string is not an argument—it merely means it could not be a good argument. Clas-
sically, I know that an argument with contradictory premises is valid, but automatically un-
sound. That does not disqualify arguments with contradictory premises as arguments—it 
merely means that such arguments will classically fail. Arguments that cannot succeed are 
certainly poor choices for convincing others, but that does not mean they are not arguments. 
 Secondly, it is just false that a string of infinite premises cannot establish a conclu-
sion. (A) has an infinite number of premises and establishes its conclusion. Indeed, one can 
plausibly argue that any finite number of premises of the given form will not be sufficient 
to establish (A)’s conclusion. Many other mathematical examples like (A) exist. 
 Perhaps Bonevac’s point fails for simple arguments, but what of complex argu-
ments? After all, the whole point of distinguishing simple arguments from complex ar-
guments was to make sure we are not conflating an infinite set of reasons with an infinite 
chain of reasoning. Clearly, the latter, in the form of an infinite regress, has been vilified. 
Richard Fumerton, for example, writes:  “finite minds cannot complete an infinitely long 
chain of reasoning, and so, if all justification were inferential, no one would be justified 
in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever.” (Fumerton 2006: 40) Hence, one 
might argue that at the very least we should prohibit complex arguments with infinite 
members, for such a complex argument would involve an infinite chain of reasoning. 
 Despite the almost universal condemnation of infinite regresses, we must take care 
to distinguish regresses that cannot be calculated from those that can. Under some fairly plau-
sible restrictions on the conditional probabilities involved, it turns out that many infinite 
chains of reasoning (infinitely many in fact) have calculable values for the probability of the 
conclusion given all the previous steps. Not only is it false that all infinite chains of reasoning 
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provide no justification for their conclusions, in some cases we can calculate precisely what 
the level of justification, understood probabilistically, is (see Peijnenburg 2007). 
 So far then, I see no reason to prohibit arguments from having an infinite num-
ber of premises. In addition, given that there appear to be clear examples of such argu-
ments, regardless of what one takes the underlying metaphysics to be, we ought to accept 
that arguments could have infinite premises. 
 Suppose however one argues that the examples are inconclusive, since we do not 
need such arguments to do the required job. For example, any infinite premise argument 
could be rewritten as a single premise argument in which the premise is just an infinitely 
long conjunction. Hence, (A) could be rewritten as: 
(A1) 1 can be paired with 2, and 2 can be paired with 4, and 3 can be paired with 6, and 
…  
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
Alternatively, we could rewrite at least some such arguments as two premise mathemati-
cal inductions, such as: 
(AMI) 1 can be paired with 2. 
For any n, if n can be paired with 2n, then n +1 can be paired with 2n+2. 
Hence, the natural numbers can be in one-to-one correspondence with the even 
numbers. 
 
Why should the fact that we could perhaps do the same job with a finite premise argument 
mean that the infinite premise arguments were not in fact arguments? After all, every single 
finite multi-premise argument can be rewritten as a single premise argument in which the 
premise is just the conjunction of the original argument’s premises. But surely no one 
wants to argue that therefore the original structure was not really an argument after all. 
 Additionally, neither (A1) nor (AMI) make clear that we can do without infinite 
premise arguments. For example, since the premise of (A1) is a conjunction I should be 
able to conclude any of the conjuncts individually, such as: 
2 can be paired with 4, 
 
and 
4 can be paired with 8, 
 
and so on. But from this infinite collection of statements I should be able to conclude that 
the even numbers can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the whole number multi-
ples of 4. Without a rather ad hoc restriction on what can be concluded from a conjunc-
tion, we can easily generate other infinite premise arguments from the premise of (A1). 
Disallowing infinite conjunctions just relocates the original problem—now we need a 
reason, other than mere stipulation, for disallowing infinite conjunctions. 
 Similarly, either the universal premise in (AMI) is itself an infinite conjunction and 
so subject to the same sort of reasoning just made in the case of (A1), or the universal prem-
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ise itself is really just shorthand for an infinite number of conditional statements, in which 
case (AMI) itself contains an infinite number of premises. (A) represents the additional prem-
ises with the ellipsis; (AMI) represents them via the variable ranging over an infinite domain.  
 Since it is not at all clear that the proposed arguments in fact avoid an appeal to 
infinite premise arguments, we cannot yet use these arguments as a reason to reject the 
possibility of infinite premise arguments. So far then, all argumentation theorists ought to 
accept that arguments could have an infinite number of premises. But what of the other 
end of the spectrum—could an argument have no premises at all? 
3. CAN AN ARGUMENT HAVE ZERO PREMISES? 
Suppose arguments are composed of propositions. Could a simple argument have an 
empty premise set? There certainly are sets of a set of propositions and another proposi-
tion in which the initial set is empty. Is there any reason to exclude these sets from the 
class of arguments? Considered as sets of propositions the answer is ‘no’. Logicians 
make use of the fact that any set in which the premise set is non-empty can, given certain 
assumptions about the support relation involved, be turned into a set in which the premise 
set is empty with no change in the validity status of either set. Hence, to deny that the sets 
with empty premise sets are not arguments one would need to deny that validity (i.e., its 
not being possible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion false), is solely a 
property of arguments.
4
 Additionally, many proofs concerning the various properties of 
logical systems become much easier once the conversion has taken place. To deny that 
structures with empty premises are arguments one would effectively need to hold that 
these logical systems say nothing about arguments at all. However, neither denial seems 
plausible, at least given that we stay focused on arguments as propositions. Whatever the 
limitations of our logical systems in other regards, these systems are an extremely useful 
means of modeling numerous relations that hold amongst propositions and sets of propo-
sitions. If there is a reason to deny that empty premise set structures are arguments, it 
must come from some feature external to the nature of propositions. 
 Suppose then that arguments are composed of sentences. Could a group of sen-
tences be an argument even if no members of the group count as premises? Again, if we 
take the groups to be sets, then there is no real difference from the case of sets of proposi-
tions. But if we take the groups to be sentences written on the page, one might wonder how 
we could possibly distinguish a sentence that is a mere claim for a position from a sentence 
that is an argument for that claim. Here though is an example from Roy Sorensen: 
Many sensible people think that an argument must have premises. Not me. My re
 buttal: 
 
MT: ______________ 
Therefore, there are arguments without premises. (Sorensen 1999: 498) 
 
Even though Sorensen’s primary concern in presenting this example is circularity and 
question-begging, one might still point to Sorensen’s example and say that MT is not just 
                                                 
4  For some more reasons logicians give for premiseless arguments, see Sorensen (1999: 499). 
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the claim that arguments have no premises, rather it is an argument for that claim—one 
might even say an argument by example.
5
 We can tell it is an argument, rather than a 
mere claim, because it is presented in a standard argument form—list the premises, draw 
a line, write the conclusion. Given this standard means of presenting arguments, then for 
any sentence at all we have a means of distinguishing when the sentence is merely a 
claim, and when it is the conclusion of a premiseless argument. 
 Perhaps however whether a sentence is an argument depends not on the other 
structures around it, but what we can or cannot do with it. We cannot argue merely by 
uttering or presenting sentences such as: 
 Hence, every even number is the sum of two prime numbers, 
 
or 
 Therefore, arguments can have no premises. 
 
If we cannot argue via these sorts of sentences then we should not count them as arguments. 
 More generally, one might plausibly argue that what makes something an act of 
arguing is that it is, at the very least, an act of reason-giving.
6
 If there is no reason-giving 
then there is no arguing, and if there is no arguing then there is no argument. So one 
might claim that those who take arguments to be composed of acts have a very good rea-
son to reject premiseless arguments—you cannot argue without giving reasons. 
 The issue, however, is not so clear cut for the advocates of arguments as acts. At 
the very least one cannot restrict acts of arguing to speech acts. Consider for example, how 
I might gesture at pictures of the Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Congresswoman Giffords 
shooters and then say, “thus, the United States needs more stringent gun laws.” No speech 
act has occurred that is a reason-giving act, yet it is quite plausible to say that an act of ar-
guing occurred. More generally, one might plausibly claim that the gesture itself is not any 
act of premising, and so I can perform acts that do not involve explicit premising acts. 
 Of course, one might deny that my example is an act of arguing, though one then 
needs to say why. One might claim that the gesture (or the pictures or both) makes the 
audience think of relevant premises, and so the audience at least performs a relevant act 
of premising. But still my act of arguing does not appear to involve any premise acts. One 
might claim that the gesture is a sort of premising act via the pictures or the context of the 
pictures. But if the pictures or the context of the pictures are what is truly relevant, then 
one is no longer holding that arguments are composed of acts, but more likely falling 
back on arguments as some sort of content (propositional or otherwise) that is merely be-
ing presented via the act of arguing. 
 Resolving these possibilities carefully is well beyond the scope of this paper. For the 
moment I will grant that arguing requires reason-giving. But the question remains—does that 
mean there are no zero-premise arguments? If we commit to the claim that for every argu-
                                                 
5  Note that Sorensen does not take arguments to be sentences, but rather propositions.  Regardless, some-
one who does take arguments to be sentences still might point to Sorensen’s example as an example of 
an argument with no premises.  
6  J.A. Blair, in Blair 2003, for example suggests that what is common to all understandings of argument 
and arguing is the giving of reasons. 
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ment there is a corresponding act of arguing, then the answer appears to be ‘yes’. But must 
we commit to the claim that for every argument there is a corresponding act of arguing?   
 At the very least we already have a reason to reject the claim that for every ar-
gument there is a corresponding act of arguing that makes every element of the original 
argument explicit—the fact that we can use finite acts of arguing as stand-ins for infinite 
acts of arguing refutes that. But one might still insist that the zero case is different than 
the infinite case. In the infinite case, God could at least perform the infinite act, but not 
even God could argue using just a conclusion. 
 Suppose arguing with just a conclusion is impossible. Consequently, those who 
hold that arguments are composed of acts might deny that there are any premiseless ar-
guments. But should the supposition that arguing with just a conclusion is impossible also 
commit those who hold that arguments are composed of say, propositions, to denying ze-
ro-premise arguments? Certainly some logicians and philosophers have let what arguing 
is dictate what arguments are. For example, according to Sorensen, Augustus De Morgan 
held that arguing was the deriving of a conclusion from the combining of information. 
Since combining requires two things to start with, “De Morgan believed that an argument 
must have at least two premises” (Sorensen 1999: 500). 
 Despite the fact that some theorists let the nature of arguing dictate the nature of 
arguments, we are certainly not compelled to do so. One can grant that arguing requires 
reason-giving, but hold that some arguments are not (and perhaps even cannot) be used to 
argue or convince, etc. Instead, some arguments, such as the zero-premise ones, can be 
used to help us understand the possible support relations amongst propositions or to de-
fine the notion of logical truth.  
 But surely the function of arguing, of providing an argument, just is to convince 
someone of, or at least alter one’s attitude toward, some claim on the basis of reasons. 
Again this claim can be granted. Arguing may have that function
7—but the arguments 
which are not used to argue do not. That does not mean they are not arguments—they are 
merely arguments that we do not use for the purpose of arguing. Advocates of arguments 
as propositions who do not hold that an appeal to function helps distinguish arguments 
from non-arguments will just not find an appeal to the function of arguing compelling. 
 Even if one holds that distinguishing arguments from non-arguments requires an 
appeal to function, one can still accept that the function of arguing is to convince via rea-
sons and accept zero-premise arguments. One need only deny that such a function is the 
way, or the only way, to distinguish arguments from non-arguments.
8
 As long as there is at 
least one function that can be served by zero-premise structures, such as defining the concept 
of logical truth, then advocates of arguments as propositions, who also hold that function dis-
tinguishes arguments from non-arguments, can still accept arguments with no premises.  
4. CONCLUSION 
If what I have argued here is correct, then everyone should accept the possibility of infinite 
premise arguments. On the other hand, whether we should accept zero-premise arguments 
seems to depend upon the resolution of other highly controversial options in argumentation 
                                                 
7  See Goodwin (2007) for an argument that arguing and arguments may have no function. 
8  See Hitchcock (2009) for an example of the view that arguments can have multiple functions.  
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theory such as—does every argument need a corresponding act of arguing? Does defining 
argument require an appeal to function? Trying to resolve these issues is a project for an-
other time. At the very least, however, I hope that I have sketched out a position according 
to which it is straightforwardly possible for there to be zero-premise arguments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Stripped down, Geoff Goddu’s core argument seems to run as follows: A simple argu-
ment is a set consisting of a set of premisses and a conclusion. Whether you take the 
premisses and conclusion to be propositions or sentences or speech act types, the set of 
premisses can in principle be denumerable or empty. Since logicians use both denumera-
bly-premissed and zero-premissed arguments in their theorizing, and both sorts can be 
expressed by sentences and used in acts of arguing, and indeed we can construct exam-
ples of each sort, then arguments can have infinitely many premisses and can also have 
zero premisses, regardless of how one conceives of arguments—except that there cannot 
be zero-premiss arguments if one conceives of arguments as complex speech acts in 
which reasons are given. 
2. TWO OBJECTIONS 
Goddu’s provocative question and challenging response raise fundamental questions 
about how we are to conceive of arguments and what evidence we should accept for the 
existence and content of a particular argument. 
 Let me begin by raising an objection to Goddu’s general conception of a simple 
argument. Suppose that we think that an argument is composed of sentences. Then a sim-
ple argument is not just a set consisting of a set of sentences and a sentence. For the set 
{{‘snow is white’, ‘grass is green’}, ‘birds sing’} is no argument unless ‘birds sing’ is 
being drawn as a conclusion from the set {‘snow is white’, ‘grass is green’}. It is fine to 
say that an argument is a pair consisting of a set of premisses and a conclusion. But a set 
consisting of a set of sentences and a sentence does not consist of a set of premisses and a 
conclusion unless there is some indication that the sentence is being inferred from the set 
of sentences. If we are to conceive of an argument as an abstract object that can be ex-
pressed in different ways and on different occasions and used for different purposes, we 
must include in our characterization of such an abstract object its illative component, the 
part signified in English by inferential uses of such particles as ‘because’, ‘since’, ‘so’ 
and ‘therefore’. (Adding an illative component to the basic conception of argument, as far 
as I can see, does not affect the main line of Goddu’s argument, since he attends to the 
question whether a set whose component set is infinite or empty can be expressed or used 
using an illative.) 
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 Another objection: The terminology of mathematical logic is as far as I can see 
irrelevant to the question how many premisses an argument can have. Mathematical logic 
does not theorize about arguments. The word ‘argument’ does not appear in the lengthy 
index to the Whiggish history of logic written by William and Martha Kneale (1962), in 
which the history of logic is selectively raided for those bits that can be construed as lead-
ing up to contemporary mathematical logic. Nor does the word ‘argument’ appear in the 
index of Forbes (1994), the textbook that I use when teaching basic symbolic logic to 
graduate students in philosophy, although the book starts with two pages about arguments 
before getting down to the real business. Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey (2007), the text-
book that I used most recently for teaching the metatheory of first-order logic and first-
order arithmetic, does contain one occurrence of the word ‘argument’ in the index, but in 
the sense of an argument of a function. The word ‘argument’ does not appear at all in the 
index of Jeffrey (2006), another textbook I have used in the past for teaching metalogic. It 
appears in the index to Church’s (1956) classic only in the sense of an argument as input 
to a function. In its first 71 volumes (1936 to 2006), The Journal of Symbolic Logic, the 
leading journal in mathematical logic, published exactly one article (Chong and Yang 
1998) with the word ‘argument’ in its title. By comparison, the journal Informal Logic in 
its first 30 volumes (up to 2010) published 75 articles with the word ‘argument’ in the 
title. (The Journal of Symbolic Logic did publish 11 reviews of books with the word ‘ar-
gument’ in their titles. Of these book titles, four refer to particular arguments such as the 
ontological argument or the master argument of Diodorus, two describe the book itself as 
an argument, two refer generally to legal argument, one (Peter Geach’s Reason and Ar-
gument) refers to argument in general, one uses the phrase ‘for the sake of the argument’, 
and one refers to argument in the sense of an input to a function.) 
 To repeat: Mathematical logic does not theorize about arguments. One method 
of proving the completeness of first-order logic does involve the construction of an infi-
nite set of sentences of the formal language of the logic. Mathematical logicians can hap-
pily use this method without committing themselves to the existence of arguments with 
infinitely many premisses. They can even note that the set of sentences is consistent, in 
which case no logical falsehood follows from it. But remarks about what follows from an 
infinite set of sentences do not imply that there are arguments with that set as a premiss. 
Likewise, mathematical logicians have the bad habit of using the word ‘valid’ not only 
for arguments that cannot, logically speaking, have true premisses and a false conclusion 
but also for sentences that must be true. But they don’t actually refer to valid sentences as 
arguments, and nothing other than a certain theoretical neatness obliges them to do so. It 
would be less misleading for them to use the term ‘logically true’ for sentences that must 
(logically speaking) be true. 
 We are left with Goddu’s examples of a simple argument with infinitely many 
premisses and a simple argument with zero premisses. 
3. CAN AN ARGUMENT HAVE INFINITELY MANY PREMISSES? 
As far as I can see, Goddu has argued very nicely in terms of his example of an argument 
with infinitely many premisses that a finite sequence of inscriptions can express through 
such devices as ellipsis or the phrase ‘and so on’ an argument with a denumerable set of 
premisses, and similarly that a finite sequence of speech act types can use such an argu-
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ment. I would like to push the envelope even further by asking whether there can be ar-
guments with a non-enumerably infinite set of premisses. After all, non-constructivist 
mathematicians recognize the existence of non-enumerably infinite sets, such as the set of 
real numbers. So, unless one is a constructivist, there is no objection in principle to argu-
ments with a non-enumerable infinity of premisses. Can one express such an argument in 
sentences and use it by uttering a series of speech acts? Well, consider the proof by 
means of a geometrical diagram (Fig. 1) that there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the set of real numbers properly between 0 and 1 and the entire set of real numbers. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Geometrical diagram 
The proof involves setting up a correspondence between the points on the open interval 
(0, 1) and the points on the entire x-axis. If from a point A on the open interval one draws 
a perpendicular straight line that meets the semi-circle in the figure at some point B, then 
draws a straight line from the centre of the semi-circle through B to some point C on the 
x-axis, and one does the same for every point on the open interval, then there will be a 
one-to-one correspondence between the set of points on the open interval and the set of 
points on the x-axis, i.e. between the set of real numbers properly between 0 and 1 and 
the entire set of real numbers. One might argue for the left-to-right part of this corre-
spondence as follows: 
(1) A point A on the open interval will be connected to exactly one point on the x–
axis by means of a perpendicular to the x–axis at that point and a straight line 
from the centre of the semi-circle through the point on its circumference inter-
sected by that perpendicular to the x-axis. 
(2) Similarly, another point A′ on the open interval will be connected to exactly one 
point on the x–axis by means of a perpendicular to the x–axis at that point and a 
straight line from the centre of the semi-circle through the point on its circum-
ference intersected by that perpendicular to the x-axis. 
(3) And so on.  
(4) Hence every point on the open interval will be connected to exactly one point on 
the x–axis by means of a perpendicular to the x–axis at that point and a straight 
line from the centre of the semi-circle through the point on its circumference in-
tersected by that perpendicular to the x-axis. 
As far as I can see, Goddu’s arguments against attempts to deny that his example ex-
presses an argument with infinitely many premisses work equally well against attempts to 
deny that this example expresses an argument with infinitely many premisses. But, by 
Cantor’s method of diagonalization, the premisses of this argument are not enumerable. 
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Hence, even with unlimited time it would be impossible to enumerate all its premisses. 
Even a being that uttered each sentence of the argument in half the time of its immediate 
predecessor would not complete the utterance of all the premisses. In fact, if the premiss-
es are ordered in the same order as the real numbers in the open interval (0, 1), then no 
premiss has an immediate predecessor or an immediate successor. So perhaps even God 
cannot state all the premisses of this argument. But a finite human being can indicate them. 
 What about the worries of intuitionists and other constructivists about the postu-
lation of actual infinities? Iemhoff (2009) reminds us that “in intuitionism all infinity is 
considered to be potential infinity. In particular this is the case for the infinity of the natu-
ral numbers.” Intuitionists do however talk about infinite sets, as Iemhoff’s article exem-
plifies. But, as she remarks, “Since for the intuitionist all infinity is potential, infinite ob-
jects can only be grasped via a process that generates them step-by-step.” (Iemhoff 2009) 
The premisses of Goddu’s example can be generated step by step. So it seems unexcep-
tionable from an intuitionist point of view. There is however no process that generates the 
set of real numbers step-by-step, so my example is problematic from an intuitionist per-
spective. Nevertheless, Brouwer, the father of intuitionism, found a way to accommodate 
the continuum in intuitionist mathematics. So perhaps intuitionists and other constructiv-
ists can accommodate an argument with a continuum of premisses. 
 My sample argument for the connection of each member of the set of real num-
bers between 0 and 1 to exactly one real number establishes, we might suppose, that an 
argument can have a set of premisses whose cardinality is that of the power set of the set 
of natural numbers. Can there be arguments whose set of premisses has a cardinality even 
greater? Well, consider the power set of the set of real numbers. It has a cardinality great-
er than that of the set of real numbers (by a variant of Cantor’s diagonalization method). 
And its cardinality is the same as that of the power set of the set of real numbers between 
0 and 1. Presumably one can construct an argument that each member of the power set of 
the set of real numbers between 0 and 1 is connected by some specified method of con-
nection to exactly one member of the power set of the set of real numbers. This argument 
would have even more infinitely many premisses than the argument for the connection of 
each point on the (0, 1) interval with exactly one real number. 
 And this process can be repeated for the power set of that power set. And so on. 
Thus there seems to be no upper limit to the non-denumerable infinities of premisses that 
an argument can have. (Parenthetically, I note that I have just used an argument with a 
denumerable infinity of premisses, thus giving an actual case supporting Goddu’s claim 
that there can be arguments with infinitely many premisses.) 
4. CAN AN ARGUMENT HAVE ZERO PREMISSES? 
As to Goddu’s example, borrowed from Roy Sorensen, of an argument with zero prem-
isses, here we are on shakier ground. Sorensen argues by ostension that there are argu-
ments with zero premisses by producing one, written with a label ‘MT’ followed by a 
colon followed by an underlining with nothing above it followed by another line on 
which is written the sentence “Therefore, there are arguments without premises”. This 
example is a parody of an argument. The word ‘therefore’ in its inferential use indicates 
as part of its meaning that what follows it is being inferred from what precedes it. Any 
conclusion introduced by such an illative must be preceded by at least one premiss, which 
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may perhaps be indicated contextually rather than actually stated. Without such a contex-
tual indication, the sequence of words ‘Therefore there are arguments without premisses’ 
is not an argument with zero premisses, because it is not an argument. It is an ill-formed 
piece of discourse, because there is nothing preceding the word ‘therefore’ from which 
the statement is being inferred.  
 Goddu’s own example, of someone pointing at pictures of mass killers in the 
United States and then asserting, “thus, the United States needs more stringent gun laws,” 
strikes me as an argument, but as one with three premisses, namely the indications of the 
killers at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University and the Tucson Safeway 
store where Congresswoman Giffords was shot. The fact that the arguer adduces these 
premisses by pointing rather than making statements is irrelevant to their status as prem-
isses. Arguments can (and do) have visual premisses, such as photographs or drawings. 
 As Goddu points out, if there were arguments with zero premisses, then their 
expression in sentences and their use as complex speech acts would have to be distin-
guished from the mere assertion of their conclusion by the use of an illative, such as ‘so’ 
preceding the conclusion or ‘because’ following it. But such illatives have as part of their 
meaning a connection between two items, a premiss and a conclusion. (The use of ‘be-
cause’ or ‘just because’ with no ensuing clause, as a response to a request to justify a 
claim, is a refusal to give a supporting premiss, not the introduction of an empty set of 
premisses.) The empty set cannot be a premiss linked by an illative to a conclusion. So 
one can neither express nor use an argument with zero premisses. And that’s a pretty 
strong reason for thinking that there cannot be any such arguments.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Thus Goddu has established by his example that there are arguments with infinitely many 
premisses. Indeed, it appears that there are analogous examples with non-denumerably 
infinitely many premisses and that there is no upper limit to how great an infinity of 
premisses an argument can have. But there are, as far as I can see, no arguments with 
zero premisses. 
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1. DEFINING ‘ARGUMENT’ 
Hitchcock writes of my articulation: 
A simple argument is a set consisting of a set of premisses and a conclusion. Whether you 
take the premisses and conclusion to be propositions or sentences or speech act types, the set 
of premisses can in principle be denumerable or empty. (p. 1) 
These two sentences misrepresent my articulation. I define arguments in terms of sets only 
for propositions. I do not define arguments in terms of sets for sentences or speech acts. I 
consider the possibility that those who prefer arguments to be composed of sentences are 
talking about sets, but quickly dismiss it on the grounds that the arguments from the propo-
sition discussion will apply and go on to consider further reasons why an argument com-
posed of sentences could have infinite members. I never consider the possibility that argu-
ments are sets of acts—merely that arguments are composed of acts or are complex acts. 
 As a result, Hitchcock’s first objection, that my definition of simple argument is 
missing a needed ‘illative’ component is off the mark. Perhaps arguments composed of 
sentences or acts need an illative component, but arguments construed as sets of proposi-
tions do not. Though a full defense would require more space than available in a short 
reply, the main idea is that capturing hypothetical or possible, but non-actual arguments, 
in terms of propositions will make appeal to the illative unnecessary. 
 Hitchcock’s second objection is that “Mathematical logic does not theorize 
about arguments” (p. 2). Perhaps he is correct. At the very least he is correct that mathe-
matical logicians rarely use the term ‘argument’ within their discussions. But they do talk 
of logical truths, well-formed formulas, sets of propositions, etc. in such a way that the 
defender of the view that arguments are a certain sort of set of propositions can claim 
that, at least indirectly, the discussions of mathematical logicians do concern those sets, 
even if they do not call them arguments.  
2. THE ILLATIVE AND ZERO PREMISES 
While Hitchcock is perfectly willing to accept arguments with infinite premises, he resists 
the case for arguments with zero premises.  Concerning my possible example of pointing 
at pictures of mass killers, he writes that it strikes him as argument, but one with premis-
es, namely the pictures.  Perhaps he is correct, but speech act theorists, the target of this 
particular example, cannot appeal to the pictures. The point of my example was to argue 
that speech act theorists face a dilemma—either, on their view, there is no act of arguing 
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going on in the example, or some arguments composed of speech acts can have no prem-
ises.  Speech act theorists however cannot appeal to the pictures as premises, since argu-
ments, on their view, are composed of speech acts. 
 Concerning Sorensen’s argument MT he writes: 
[T]his example is a parody of an argument.  The word ‘therefore’ in its inferential use indi-
cates as part of its meaning that what follows it is being inferred from what precedes it. Any 
conclusion introduced by such an illative must be preceded by at least one premise. (p. 4)  
As it stands, Hitchcock’s second sentence does not follow from the first.  If we infer the 
conclusion from what precedes it, namely nothing, then we satisfy the meaning of the in-
ferential use of the illative without it being the case that the illative must be preceded by at 
least one premise.  Later Hitchcock provides a stronger meaning when he writes: “such illa-
tives have as part of their meaning a connection between two items, a premise and a con-
clusion.”(p. 5) But does the illative have the stronger meaning rather than merely the weak-
er one (or the weaker one at all)? Even if it does, those who do not hold the illative as part 
of the argument need not be moved by Hitchcock’s appeal to the meaning of the illative. 
